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I
TO every man of thought there comes a time when he faces
the question, "what, rationally, am I to believe and what am I to
reject?" Feeling that in the past so much has been taken for
granted, he joins in sceptic mood with the cry of Pope, "what can
we reason but from what we know?"
It is perhaps in the works of Plato, "the first true theist and
systematic philosopher," that one may trace the beginnings of a
rational and logical attempt to distinguish "opinion" from "reasoned
knowledge." Although Plato adopted a theistic attitude, it was
scarcely religious, rather was it of a purely philosophical nature. In
other words his theism had no essential religious value in itself.
In fact, Plato was ofttimes at a loss to reconcile his beliefs with
his experience. It is a significant fact that, in many cases, not
finding sufficient rational proof for his belief, he narrated a myth
claimed to be symbolic of the truth.
Yet recent thought demands truth that is something more than
merely symbolical. Many thinkers nowadays seek argument and
proof for their belief to which they can affix a Q. E. D. finding
like Plato did, there is much in religion that seemingly cannot be
proved by cold reasoning. Something more than a myth is re-
quired to explain such doctrines as, for example, the Trinity : there
is a perpetual cry for "commonsense" proof and so often it is not
found. In failing to reconcile vague religious ideas with what
seem the certainties of everyday life, the "man in the street" is led
to disparage religious belief in general.
Some even are convinced of the idea that their more religiously
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inclined fellows act against the dictates of intellect, and refvising
what their mind logical!}' implies, blindly follow ideas socially ac-
cepted. Though often derided, are the}' not regarded with an ele-
ment of env}' ? Surel}' this is because deep down in mortal hearts
there is a craving for something in which to place belief. Certain
sceptics may la}' claim to the fact that the}' rejoice in believing
nothing, }'ct how^ often is this due to their having in early days
put belief in something that has betrayed or failed them! How
ofen does it appear that the sweet milk of belief has been soured
b}' a stormy crossing over life's turbulent seas!
The majorit}' of modern psychologists would deny that belief is
an instinct, }et admit that in every man lies an inborn tendency
towards it. This is patent from infancy upwards : in fact "make-
believe" is surel}' one of childhood's most popular games. From
earliest da}'s there is a continual seeking for objects of belief.
Man, then, by nature is prone to accept belief blindh'. After-
wards, a little more seasoned by experience he sets out on the same
c[uest as Plato, to distinguish belief from "reasoned knowledge,"
and fails. Then the question comes as to how much he is to be-
lieve of what he cannot prove by experience or logical argument.
lUit one point will probably strike him before this. It is, wdiy
does belief seem to stand aloof from and irreconcilable with "ra-
tional knowledge?" An obvious answer suggests itself to this; the
realm of belief stands just halfwa}' between the domains of logic
and' psychology. Every belief has its logical and also its psycholog-
ical aspect. These two have to fit together in some way, for neither
logic or ps}'cholog}' have sheltered belief wholl}'. Thus belief, to
quote Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, has fallen a prey to theology and become
annexed purely to religious terminology instead of being used in a
better, broader sense.
The whole root of the C|itestion, however, lies in what is the
ultimate nature of "rational knowledge." To the plain man it would
stand merely on merit of its name, but epistemology sheds a dif-
ferent light on the general prospect. It denies the "rational knowl-
edge" our ancestors would have accepted that a flower is blue
because one sees it so, that a table exists because it is tangible.
What was proved for them is not necessarily proved today. A
great revolution of thought has come about and even the "rational"
proofs of logic and mathematics are not left unchallenged ; many
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are asking afresh whether there is such a thing as definite and
fixed knowledge at all
!
Thus we see that the distinction between knowing and believing
in a thing is not so very marked. This is largely because "rational
knowledge," such as we find in logic and mathematics is based upon
fixed postulates, in other words, on assumption, whence it proceeds
abstractedly from what is postulated.
This form of abstract reason sureh' is liable to arrive at ab-
surd and incredible results. To take a familiar case of schoolbo}'
days. If a man papers a room in one hour, sixty men will do so in
a minute. Unfortunately the defects of human nature and the
limited character of space render this impossible, yet it is mathe-
matically sound. It is claimed that two plus two can lead to one
result only, yet do, for example two caterpillars plus two systems
of tarifi: reform make four? Four what? Also what do two plus
two drops of water make?—one drop. If religion is abstract surely
science is too ! There w^ould seem, in fact, to be little certainty at
all. Certainty, then, is not absolute, it possesses various degrees
of probability. Three types of certainty may be roughly picked
out, they are not wholly distinct yet will serve for general, normal
purposes.
First, there is "commonsense" certainty, a very valuable (/aide
in life, yet nothing more. It is "commonsense" to suppose if winter
comes spring cannot be far behind. In other words, one relies on
what has happened before to take place again, following the out-
come of experience; a necessary step in a great deal that we do.
It is sometimes surprising to realize how much of life is carried on
under the assumption that as things have been, so they will be.
Were it not possible to assume this ofttimes one would indeed be
much at a loss ! Most branches of mathematical certainty would
probably fall under this heading; it is a "commonsense" truth that
two and two make four.
Next comes "intuitive" certainty, i.e. what is known zifitliiii to
be certain. r)ne may feel "intuitively" certain that one exists yet
if called upon absolutely to prove that existence, .some very formid-
able barriers would be found in the way, and it is improbable that
a final proof could be given that would satisfy modern philosophy.
Yet one feels "intuitively" certain of a conscience at work within
directing towards what is felt sure to be right, but which could
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hardlv be proved so. This is probably because "right" is not a
thing in itself, it is relative to what is accepted good. The human
conscience, though one of the greatest gifts bestowed upon man,
surelv is not a divine oracle; sometimes it is corrupted and gives
a perverted answer. Does not a conscience owe its growth to what
is customaril}' considered right and wrong in the social life of its
possessor? A South Sea islander would, it appears, feel little, if
any, pangs of conscience at eating his fellow—such has been the
custom of his fathers and his father's fathers. Yet a white man
might feel conscience-stricken at drowning a kitten ! Thus one is
led to assume that even the dictates of conscience are largely of a
social nature : the}' often direct aright yet deserve not to be called
b}' any means absolute. ,
The third certaint\' is "moral." One may feel cjuite certain,
for example, in allowing a close friend to manage one's money
matters. Yet this does not rise much beyond the level of "com-
monsense" and "intuitive" certainty.
To return to the original question :—how is belief reconcilable
with rational certainty ? The varying types of certainty have been
examined and found based on certain inabsolute yet accepted postu-
lates. In other words, the bases of belief and rationality have been
placed on a similar level. Does it not seem that it is impracticable
to draw a hard and fast line between belief and certainty, for cer-
tainty needs a basis of belief before it becomes such—the two are
part and parcel of one another? Such is the position so far as-
sumed.
In this light, therefore, surel}' religious belief has as much right
to demand postulates as has mathematics and "rational knowledge."
It remains to find the essential postulate of religion. It lies in a
world-wide phenomenon which may be found in the fact that every
form of worship postulates some sort of a sympathy between the
cosmic order and man's destiny. Should it be objected here that
certain oriental religions postulate the utter wretchedness and
generally abject nature of existence, it is an accepted belief that
some respite will be granted in the end ; the deity will be com-
passionate at some time and alleviate his distressed worshippers.
Although the Buddhist looks upon life as a state of misery one of
his most assured convictions is that of a Nirvana : there is an ulti-
mate element of sympathy between creator and created.
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Christianity, from a different viewpoint, regards that sympathy
to be of the present—God is forever compassionate. Dr. W. R.
Matthews, the Dean of King's College, says that the Christian faith
in the phrase "God so loved the world " speaks of God, the
world and the relation between them ; the quest of philosophy put
in a nutshell. Thus Christianity and Buddhism, the West and the
East, meet in agreement that the great postulate of religion is sym-
pathy. This element is found, too, even in the most savage and
primitive religions of the world that regard the deity as a hostile
being to be propitiated, it is the fact that attempts are made to pro-
pitiate him that shows there is an expectance of merc}'^ of ultimate
sympathy. Sympathy may not be characteristic. }'et it lies within
"The all powerful."
The Christian postulate of religion has just been mentioned:
Christianity by saying God is love gives the clearest form of this
universal belief. It is incredible that in his heart of hearts a man
can claim an absolute misfit between value and reality, to do this
would be to stultify the whole of human life and work: the amazing
creation is not a meaningless mockery. This is the essential belief
of religion that claims as much right to her postulates as science
has to her axioms ; and there is, incidentally, no insurmountable
barrier between the postulated and the axiomatic, indeed Dr. Schiller
supports this by claiming axioms are but successfully established
postulates.
Religious belief is but a portion of the whole field of belief,
and it is unfortunate that this latter should so frequentlx' have
attached a theological connotation. Familiar and recognized se-
quences in natural phenomena are known by reason of "common-
sense," but as soon as one passes beyond the evidence of the senses
the world of "hypothesis" is entered. Religious belief is thus
dubbed "hypothetical" yet surely it is not more so than other forms
of beUef.
Science, for example, thrives upon beliefs. Probability is "the
guide of life"; this is illustrated well by the continual biological
variations, by these the developments of nature have been made
possible. Natural organisms of the present times are the result of
countless years of development occasioned largely by gradual varia-
tion : the modern horse, for example, is known to be descended
from an animal some three feet high. The theories of Darwin,
BELIEF AND REASON 617
despite continual criticism, seem to remain for the most part un-
deniable ; more recent discovery strengthens rather than questions
their truth. Alan, whether or no he be stamped by God in His own
image, is the outcome of thousands of years of development. ]\len-
del, the secluded monk in his monastic garden, has brought the
world to see that variation is an essential factor in the course of
the existence of ever}- living organism.
Hypotheses, experiments and beliefs seem as essential to the
progress of nature as to religious thought, for nature puts things
forward "in trust" that they will adapt themselves to environment
and flourish. A creeper gradual!}' sends out its climbing tendrils to
explore the way, for example, up the side of a house entirely "on
trust" that the_\- will find root. To continue the parallel, religious
belief is in like manner ever climbing and clinging "in trust" to ( iod
to find a fixed resting place for the soul. Nature develops herself
by experiment and hypothesis, likewise does man in the course of
his religious development, in the process of coming into closer
knowledge or fellowship with God. It is not a matter of accepting
dogmas or fixed creeds, but a yearning of the soul towards the
truth : some indeed may claim to have attained that truth, yet even
after that there still remains a never ending state of experimentation
to perfection.
To sum up the position taken : Science has her axioms and
postulates, which though not absolute, are justly applicable. So has
religion, which claims as much a right to them as does science and
"rational knowledge." Religion demands some s}mpathy between
creator and created, whilst the fellowship between the two is a
gradual and experimental process of development according to
natural lines. The phenomena of the religious experience do har-
monize with other phenomena; so often they are regarded as being
entirely exceptional, not as reconcilable with the rest of human life.
Religion, says one -modern writer, can claim, in common with
the sciences, the right first to describe its own particular sets of
phenomena, secondly to set out what they implicate, and finall}' to
examine the validity of the postulates relied upon, for the nature of
belief as connected with the religious experience concurs with that
of other phenomena.
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II.
There are many who entirely disavow the accepted relig^ious
beliefs and, along with Herbert Spencer, sarcastically call religion
"a hypothesis supposed to render the universe comprehensible." As
has been said, it is not infrequently thought that the religiously-
minded are consciously and purposely blinding their eyes to fact in
their endeavor to find an unfindable why and wherefore for "the
way things act," to put it in the words of Byron, "sapping a solemn
creed with solemn sneer." A certain school of thought forbids the
looking upon religious belief as the normal and ver}- natural process
of deepening one's fellowship with, and knowledge of, the divine.
Rather does it "look for a sign," or something unnatural, for men
of today do not very greatly differ from their brethren of two thou-
sand years ago, whilst those who are still expectant one day of
entering a city of gold resounding with the music of harps would
seem to forget Him who said, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within
}0U."
Religious belief is essentially natural, can and should be gradu-
ally developed according to the believer's mind, is not separate from
the rest of human experience. In other words it should not be
isolated and kept in a realm apart, though Schleiermacher claims for
religion "an independent domain over and above metaphysics and
ethics." Whether it be an instinct or no, religious belief is natural
to man who feels his need for the divine in the same wav as for
the many other necessities of life. This is strengthened by the fact
that there is not a tribe in the world entirely void of some sort of
religious beliefs : they ma}' be there in a very crude form yet are
certainly present in some way. How it comes about is a subject of
much dispute : W'undt, for example, expresses the view that an
ideal existence is the original source of religious feeling, all ideas
are religious that refer to the ideal. Though this holds good in
much it can hardly be claimed conclusive for all. Hegel identified
religion with philosophy whilst David Hume discovers its origin
"not from a contemplation of the works of nature, but from a con-
cern with regard to the events of life and from the incessant hopes
and fears which actuate the human mind."
Differing as these theories may be there is underlying them a
gradual and natural realization of the divine. It is true that no
reference has so far been made to the religions that embody magic
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and the supernormal. \\ here religion begins and magic ends is
not a clear cut line, yet in this essay the viewpoint of Alartineau
has been adopted distinguishing religion as "the belief in an ever
living God, that is, a divine mind and will ruling the universe and
holding moral relation with mankind. It is the word "moral" that
is the great "differentia" of religion as we understand it, and dis-
tinguishes it from magic and witchcraft. ^Moreover, the aim of
religion is to deepen that moral relation, and this deepening is a
gradual, normal process.
Belief in God has not unsuitabl}- been likened to deep trust placed
in a friend. One may put utter trust in that friend on the very
tiirst day of acquaintance, and utter belief in God the first time He
is realized. \et iust as in friendship, the divine fellowship broadens
as the \ears roll b\-, growing more perfect and complete. True
religious belief, then, is a gradual, slow }et sure strengthening of
one's fellowshij) with (iod, its essence lies here rather than in
tenets and creeds, dogmas and fixed phrases, as sceptics are often
led to think. The Christian church, especially today is much mis-
understood with regard to its beliefs. Its object is not to la}' down
the law "you must believe this, you must do that"—rather does it
seek to lead men to a clearer knowledge of God through Jesus
Christ, or to quote its aim in the words of the title of a famous work
of theology, "Through Christ to God." Natural]}', the church ac-
cording to its varied branches and denominations has dift'erent ways
of expressing this belief. Sceptics are apt to lay hands on these
differing wa}s, find one or another of them irreconcilable with
their o\\ n \iewpoint, and reject the whole because of the part. Any
belief that savours of dogma is dropped upon and often a far more
dogmatical proclamation is made against the validity of an accepted
truth, for, as Dr. Schiller has remarked, all disbelief is reall}' be-
lief in something else.
^'et few would den}' that the really genuine sceptic ( there are
indeed ver}- few of them!) really plays quite a valuable ])art in
the i)rogress of religious belief. It is he who helps to keep alive
that necessary spirit of inquiry in'eventing the all too common
tendenc}' to take things for granted. There are doubtless still such
people as the now famous peasant, who, when questioned as to his
creed, replied, "I believe what the Holy Church believes." "But
wfiat does the Holv Church believe?" he was asked. "How am I
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to know?" said he, "but I expect the priest could tell you." One
cannot feel wholly devoid of sympathy for the man who is sceptical
of such things as this, and it can be well argued that nowadays
there can be found no sufficient reason why positive belief should
be considered meritorious simply because it is positive whilst dis-
belief is wicked merely because of its negativeness.
Those strongly convicted of their belief would sometimes damn
the "doubter" as lost, yet as one well known Oxford philosopher
writes, "to know when to doubt and when to believe, when to
deliberate and when to act, may make all the difference between
sanity and insanity, success and failure in life." It is in this realm
that truth is discovered and discriminated from error and from it
are fully tested truths brought into the field of belief whilst proven
errors are transported to that of disbelief. It is not always patent
that the way to truth is often found through mistakes, not through
"uncontradicted affirmatives." This was realized even by \er\
ancient philosophy ; the doctrine of Heraclitus was that truth owed
its source to conflict, whilst, as Pythagoras wrote, "Of everything
two views may be taken."
The main issue of this little essay is that true knowledge of
God is a natural experimental development, progressing much in
the same way as other form of knowledge or science. Yet many
have taken the view that religion is the very "last word" in finality
and absoluteness, and therefore, incidentally, unprogressive. This
is how religion and science are so often seemingly set in opposition
against one another. Science is restlessly progressive, shrinking
from the conception of any truth as unalterably absolute, there is
a constant process of revision and reconstruction of beliefs to keep
in touch with the changes of reality.
The truths of science and religion, however, though kindred
in many respects cannot be regarded in exactly the same light. We
may believe in a "tenet" of a science because it has been sufficient!)
proved, yet, as William James so aptly puts it, there is indeed a
right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters in spite of
the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been
"coerced." Now the necessary postulate in every form of study is
that reality is knowable and truth is attainable and real. Religious
belief regards God as the ground of reality and claims that that
reality can be known, whilst a reality that responds to the apjiroach
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of our reason may also respond to other human values: if it does
not there is no guarantee that our reason is not a mere will-o'-the-
wisp forever doomed to excavate errors and deem them to be
truths.
The stud}' of reHgion claims that God is knowable. Yet rehgious
belief should not be based solely on facts to the exclusion of all
unproved behefs. James fails to agree with Clifford when he over-
cautiously proclaims belief to be desecrated when given to unproved
and unquestioned statements "for the solace of the believer" who
protects the purity of his belief "with a very fanaticism of jealous
care."
A\'hether one adopts an empiricist or an absolutist view of
taking the truth is a minor point, ^^'hat is vitally essential is the
actual attainment thereof, and a far lesser point is whether we in-
fallibly recognize it when it is attained. One school of empiricist
philosophy sets out the duty of a thinker as to know the truth and
to a\oid error. Yet errors are surely not such terrible things after
all ! James pleads for a lightheartedness that will not grow heav\-
if a slip occurs, a willing spirit towards belief. To those who would
sa\- it is better to go devoid of belief rather than to believe a single
lie would reply that this merely shews "a preponderant private fear
of being a dupe." Generals do not advise their soldiers that it is
better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound.
Xo, there is a call for action, for taking our life, our belief,
into our own hands. Belief is measured by action and the whole
defence of Christian faith revolves upon it; we must take a leap
no matter whether it even be into the dark. "W'e stand on a moun-
tain pass," Fitz James Stephen wrote, "in the midst of whirling
snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and
then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still we shall
be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road we shall be dashed
to pieces. \\'e do not certainly know whether there is any right
one. What must we do? "Be strong and of a good courage."
Act for the best, hope for the best and take what comes If
death ends all, we cannot meet death better."
